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Share price behaviour around trading
suspensions on the London Stock Exchange
R E Z A U L KABIR
Department of Business Administration, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE,
Tilburg, The Netherlands
The share price behaviour associated with a sample of trading suspensions on the
London Stock Exchange is analysed. Trading suspensions are found to be prevalent,
and last for a relatively long time period. The results indicate that suspensions on the
London Stock Exchange are, on average, preceded by a substantial increase in share
price, thus reflecting anticipatory price-behaviour. The presence of significant positive
abnormal return following trading suspensions is also detected. This suggests that
either the complete impact of information release takes place gradually, or not all
relevant information is disclosed during the suspension period.
INTRODUCTION
The admittance of securities to trading on a stock exchange
is quite an important event to the issuing firm. Of equal, or
perhaps greater, importance is the suspension of securities
from trading, because suspension of trading affects not only
the firm concerned but also the investors and the market
makers. Soineone who intends to buy or sell a security
cannot do so if trading of the security in question does not
take place. The price of the security during a particular
period is no longer allowed to be determined bv the usual
market mechanism.
Trading suspensions, presumably, do not happen under
normal circumstances. The authorities, who take the de-
cision to suspend trading of a certain security, use this
particular regulatory measure because of several known or
unknown reasons. The listing rules of the London Stock
Exchange (officially named the International Stock Ex-
change) state The Committee may at any time and in su.ch
circumstances as they think fit suspend or cancel a listing.
The Committee will not hesitate to do so to protect investors
and to ensure an orderly market.l sucn emergence of
circumstances needs to be interpreted in the broadest pos-
sible way. It could be an imbalance between supply and
demand in a security, a forthcoming corporate news an-
nouncement, suspicion about a firms's financial and buainc.-is
operations, the possibility of insider trading, security price
manipulation, or price fluctuations of an unusual kind.2
Now questions can be put forward as to the aptness as
well as the validity of the authority's own judgement that
something remarkable is going on of which not all market
participants are aware. How can the Stock Exchange verify
that indeed circumstances have arisen such that un-
interrupted trading of a security cannot be maintained?
Even if it is found that the belief of the authority is correct,
how can the Exchange justify its action? Does the very act of
suspension lead to the occurrence of a 'normal' market?
What are the consequences of such actions for the firm
concerned and the investors? These are a few issues which
need thorough investigation before an opinion on the
application of the suspension measure can be formed.
In fact, some researchers have addressed these issues. But
the evidence 4oes not conclusively show that normal secur-
ity trading is restored through suspension. Hopewell and
Schwartz (1978) examine the New York Stock Exchange
initiated trading suspensions, and detect pre-suspension
anticipatory price behaviour and virtually complete pnce
adjustments afterwards. Investigating the Securities and
Exchange Commission initiated trading suspensions in the
United States, Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) find substantial
1 Section 1, chapter 4 of Admission of Securities to Listing, Council of the Stock Exchange, England, 1984.
2 It is worthwhile mentioning that suspension of trading is different from cancellation of trading. The continuation of a suspension for a
prolonged period without the issuer of the concerned security taking adequate action to obtain restoration of listing may lead to eventual
cancellation. The measure can also be taken directly in some other situations.
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devaluations of the suspended securities during 3S well 3S
after the suspension period. Kryzanowski (1979) analyses a
sample of allegedly manipulated Canadian stocks, and
observes that manipulation has indeed been effective in
causing an abnormal upward movement in stock prices in
the pre-suspension period. He also finds that prices continue
to decline following the reopening of trading in case of
suspension associated with bad news. However, the opposite
does not happen in the case of good news. De Ridder (1990)
observes favourable information release during trading
suspensions, and efficient price adjustments in the post-
suspension period on the Stockholm Stock bxchange. Ana-
lysing suspensions on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange,
Kabir (1992) finds no anticipatory price behaviour and
nearly complete adjustment to new information released
during suspension.
Besides these less than conclusive results regarding share
price behaviour associated with trading suspension, the
author is not aware of any similar study performed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE), although this particular
phenomenon is widely prevalent, and sometimes in a unique
manner. For example, it is not at all uncommon on the LSE
for many trading suspensions to remain in force for several
weeks and even months. This study, therefore, investigates
the phenomenon of trading suspensions on the London
Stock Exchange, and is organized in the following manner.
Section II presents a discussion on the practice and the
theory of trading suspension. Various aspects of the sample
of trading suspensions are described in Section III. The next
section outlines the methodology, while the results of the
study are presented in Section V. The paper ends with some
concluding remarks.
II SUSPENSION OF SECURITY TRADING
Institutional practice
As mentioned earlier, a listing on the London Stock Ex-
change may be suspended at any time and in such circum-
stances as found fit by the Exchange. Usually, the measure is
adopted due to failure by the issuer of the security tO Comply
with listing obligations. One of the principal objectives of
continuing obligations is to secure immediate release of
information which might reasonably be expected to have a
material effect on market activity in, and prices of, listed
securities. Consequently, the Exchange suspends security
trading pending an announcement, or publication of facts on
the reorganization of a company, or clarification of the
position of a firm. Suspension may also take place with or
without the request of the issuer of the security, or pending
the removal of a suspension on an overseas stock exchange,
or if the market capitalization and shareholding position is
such that an adequate market in the security cannot be
maintained. The procedure for lifting trading suspension
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depends on various circumstances, and the Exchange has the
right to impose such conditions as considered appropnate.
Theoretical discussions
We have already come across several reasons to suspend
exchange trading in a security. These reasons have one thing
in common: alleged emergence of a situation where insuffi-
cient dissemination of actual information prevails. The act of
suspension, irrespective of the real reason, also produces a
common effect: making all concerned aware of something
Unusual. Once the suspension period is over, there is not
necessarily a similar effect. That depends on market evalu-
ation of the suspension, and of the newly released
information. If suspension conveys to investors unfavour-
able information (for example, the company is in financial
difficulties), then the share price adjusts downward once
trading is reinstated. On the other hand, if favourable
information is disseminated during the suspension period
(for example, successful merger negotiations), then investors
would realize positive returns over the suspension period.
When is a measure like trading suspension beneficial?
Theoretically, if the authorities are able to correctly identify
the precise moment when it could be established that the
market does not possess the right information regarding a
particular security, then a suspension might help make that
piece of information available to market participants. Thus,
one expects trading suspensions to be associated with the
release of new and material information, to the market.
Before the occurrence of suspension, one remains confident
(in a semi-strong form efficient market) that market prices of
securities reflect all publicly available information as the
Exchange is constantly monitonng all listed stocks. Tne
suspension measure is assumed to take place at such a
moment that the price of the security does not yet incorpor-
ate the new information. The very announcement of suspen-
sion alerts the market to something unusual regarding the
security.
Trading suspension remains in force until the authorities
believe that new information related to the security has been
released and the market has had sufficient time to properly
evaluate the new information. Once the suspension period is
over and trading of the security is reinstated, the price ol tne
security, if the market is efficient in the semi-strong form,
should reflect market evaluation of the newly released
information. One can then consider the trading suspension
measure as an effective one. The behaviour of the security
price during the post-suspension period is expected to be
different depending on whether the newly released informa-
tion is interpreted by the market as good or bad news.
Although considerations leading to the decision to sus-
pend security trading seem appealing, doubts may arise
about the application of this particular measure. The de
cision to suspend trading, together with its consequences,
should, in fact, be compared with the consequences of
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uninterrupted trading. According to Hopewell and
Schwartz (1978), trading suspension imposes a set of oppor-
tunity losses and gains on those market participants who
would have otherwise engaged in transactions during this
period. Evaluation of these costs and benefits depends upon
the judgment exercised. Under what circumstances is an
uninterrupted security trading then undesirable? Mendelson
(1972) suggests that continuity in trading has its merits, but
there is no virtue in providing facilities for wild trading on
half digested information and misinformation. Therefore, if
trading is suspended, then it involves a trade-off between a
postponement of execution against more accurate pricing.
But how can one know beforehand which information
would lead to correct pricing and which would not? Why not
let the security market decide on it? Stigler (1964), question-
ing stock exchanges' practice of trading suspensions, notes
the following:
To prevent a trade is no function of the Exchange, and any
defense must lie in a desire to avoid 'unnecessary' price
fluctuations. An unnecessary price fluctuation is surely
not one called for by the conditions of supply and demand
of the week, even though the fluctuations may reflect
supply and demand of the hour. This suspension of
trading means that the exchange officials know the correct
price change when there is a flood of buy or sell orders, (p.
130).
Stigler is pointing to the fact that no damage is done if
some investors who, after successful searching, possess a
piece of information and try to translate that information
into security price, or if others who do not possess the
information try to speculate on it. In such circumstances, an
interruption of continuous trading would only delay incorp-





















* Suspension on n consecutive points means:
(n—1) months < length of suspension < (n + 1) months
oration of that information into the price. And such delays
would only help the 'free riders': investors who reap only the
benefits, if any, from information released once a trading
suspension takes place, but do not bother to incur any cost
to collect it.
In sum, operational criteria to evaluate the costs and the
benefits of trading suspensions are hard to find. But, as a
whole, security trading suspension can be considered effect-
ive if it happens prior to any kind of anticipation by market
participants, and new and material information is revealed
as well as widely disseminated during the period of suspen-
sion. Investigating security prices before and after trading
suspension would help us to ascertain whether suspension is
effective in practice. On the other hand, trading suspensions
can be considered imprudent if the securities market itself
could have tackled information dissemination efficiently.
Empirical tests regarding the validity of such inference are
rather difficult to perform.
Ill DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE
Share price and other information on trading suspensions
are collected from the London Share Price Database. Like a
monthly database, it identifies only those suspensions which
occur or remain effective at the end of each month. Between
January 1970 anil March 1988, 426 trading suspensions
associated with 364 different companies were found. Among
these, 311 (85%) companies underwent suspension only
once, 44 (12%) were affected twice, and nine (3%) companies
had their securities suspended on three occasions. The time-
length of these trading suspensions is presented in Table 1. It
is observed that on 122 (29%) occasions suspension contin-
ued for at most two months (as represented by one datapoint
only), while the remaining 304 (71 %) cases were suspensions
lasting definitely more than one month (more than one
Uaiapuiiit is present). This phenomenon of so many suspen-
sions lasting such a long time is rather uncommon. It reflects
issues of vital importance concerning the suspended firm
(not mere release of specific information).
Another interesting phenomenon found in the sample is
that as much as 62% of the companies affected by trading
suspension have later on (could be several years) disap-
peared from (official listing. The reasons are reported in
Table 2. It is seen that the most important reasons for non-
survival were acquisition/takeover/merger, and liquidation-
relateH phenomena These events might prnviHe an ev-post
clue as to a possible reason behind the trading suspension
decision. There were some cases of disappearance from
official listing due to automatic cancellation - a stock
remaining suspended for more than three years; some due to
shares acquired afterwards - during suspension these shares
were traded in the over-the-counter market.
The presence of any industry bias in the sample is also
investigated. The results are shown in Table 3. It is found
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Table 5 niefrihun'nn frf companies affected bv trading suspension,
which later on disappeared from exchange listing due to various
reasons (Period: January 1970-March 1988)
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that except for industrial holding companies, no other
industry was especially affected by trading suspensions.
In performing the stock return analysis, I use a window of
six years - three years before and three years after suspen-
sion - to estimate model parameters3. Stocks having suspen-
sions within the window itself are also deleted. Thus, the
final sample consists of 83 trading suspensions involving 78
different companies. Of these, 35 firms (45%) disappeared
later on from stock exchange listing (after at least three years
of trading). Out of these, 24 were due to mergers and
acquisitions, and eight were due to liquidation. The sample
of trading suspensions has only five uumpauics with suspen-
sion taking place twice. A total of 73 firms experienced
suspension on only one occasion. A look at the duration of
trading suspension in the sample reveals that 20% even
lasted for more than six months. Another unique character-
istic is that 75 (90%) of these trading suspensions occurred in
the case of firms with less than five million pounds sterling of
market capitalization. Only eight suspensions took place for
companies with a capitalization of more than five million
pounds.
IV METHODOLOGY
I follow the standard event study methodology using altern-
ative model specifications in order to analyse the share price
behaviour. First, I use the Market Model which posits that
returns of stocks tend to go up and down together with

































Rit = the rate of return on stock i in period t
Rml — the market rate of return in period t
a,, b, = stock-i-specific and time-independent parameters
eit = random disturbance term for stock i in period t.
If suspension of trading is associated with some sort of
abnormal behaviour, then this would be reflected in the
disturbance term during the period surrounding suspension.
The estimate for the abnormal return (AR) for i in t will be
where a( and 6,- are the estimated coefficients obtained from
data which exclude ubsci vations surrounding suspension,
and t is a time-index covering the period around suspension.
Here, it is assumed that the coefficients remain unchanged in
period t. ARit is interpreted as the deviation in period t of the
return of suspended stock i from its normal relationship with
the market. The accuracy of this estimated abnormal return
obviously depends on the validity of the model used as well
as the parameter estimates.
Besides estimating abnormal returns using the Market
Model, I estimate market-adjusted returns for each stock in
order lo lesl wlictlici llic inudcl specification improperly
influences the results. The abnormal return, in this ap-
proach, is obtained in the following manner:
ARit = Rit — (3)
In each of these two alternative model specifications, the
average abnormal return (AAR) for the sample of trading
suspensions is calculated by
Rit = (1) AAR, = (1/n) AR, (4)
3 The use of a six-year history of monthly returns is not unconventional in empirical research. See, for example, Dimson and Marsh (1986)
and Franks and Harris (1989).
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where ARU is the abnormal return for stock i in period t, and
n is the number of suspensions in the sample. The estimate
AAR gives an indication of average abnormal return re-
alized by stockholders of suspended firms. In order to see
whether these abnormal returns are statistically significantly
different from zero, a t-test is performed by dividing the
average abnormal return by the standard deviation of
average abnormal returns computed from the estimation
period.
The cumulative reaction of stock prices to trading suspen-
sions is also examined. Therefore, the above averages are
cumulated over a period of time surrounding the suspension
period in order to obtain the Cumulative Average Abnormal
Return (CAAR):
CAAR = AARt (5)
The Market Model parameters are estimated by regressing
individual stock returns on the market returns using the
ordinary least squares technique. The return on the Finan-
cial Times - Actuaries All Share Index, a market value-
weighted index covering around 750 stocks and over 80% of
the aggregate UK capitalization, is used to calculate the
market return. The returns data are adjusted for dividend
payments and stock splits.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The following paragraphs provide the results obtained from
the methodologies described earlier. Month 0 is defined as
the month in which a trading suspension occurs. Month — 1
represents one month immediately before the month in
which trading suspension takes place, while month +1
represents one month after the month in which trading is
reinstated.
Market Model returns
The results obtained from using the Market Model are
presented in Table 4, and also shown graphically in Fig. 1.
Observe that there is a continuous upward trend in the
abnormal returns before the suspension period. The average
abnormal returns are positive in the five months before
trading suspension, and are statistically significant in the
two months preceding suspension. In each of the two
consecutive months before trading suspension, significant
abnormal returns of 5-6% on average are obtained. This
share price increase in the pre-suspension period could be
explained by the fact that some investors were anticipating
favourable news about the stock, or that either information
leakage or insider trading was taking place. The existence of
pre-suspension abnormal return also shows that the action
of exchange authorities came late. By the time trading was
suspended the stock prices had already increased by 19%. It
appears that the stock exchange authority becomes cons-
cious of some abnormal happening and then considers
taking the suspension measure once it finds out that the
share concerned has undergone a substantial price increase,
or that gradual release of new information has already
started.
In the first month of post-suspension trading, it is found
that stock prices increase, on average, by as much as 11 %.
This could indicate that even though new information might
have been released during the suspension period, it was not
widely disseminated among all investors. The goal of trading
suspension - ensuring equitable information dissemination
among all investors so that opportunities for some to earn
extraordinary profits disappear - seems not to be achieved.
The presence of relatively large abnormal return in the
month immediately following trading suspension could also
suggest inefficient lagged adjustment to new information
released during the suspension period.
Market-adjusted returns
In order to see whether the above findings are influenced by
the Market Model specification, I have analysed the behavi-
our of stocks around trading suspension using the market-
adjusted returns. The results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained earlier. Positive abnormal returns before
trading suspension are found. In the month following re-
instatement of trading a more pronounced increase in share
prices is also detected.
Non-merger sample
One may point out that the sample of trading suspensions
contains an unusually large number of firms involved in
Table 4. Average abnormal returns around trading suspensions; (Market Model results)
Month AAR t(AAR) CAAR Month AAR t(AAR)
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Fig. \. Average abnormal returns around trading suspensions:
(Market Model}
merger and acquisition activities. In fact, there were 24 firms
in my sample which disappeared from the stock exchange
listing at a later stage due to merger/acquisition. One would
then be inclined to think that the abnormal returns found in
my analysis could perhaps be due to the anticipation of
future merger and/or acquisition. Therefore, in order to
remove such a possibility, all trading suspensions related to
these 24 firms are eliminated from the sample. The analysis is
then carried out for a sub-sample consisting of 55 trading
suspensions. Here, I should mention that those 24 firms had
their securities traded for at least another three years, it is
highly unlikely that share prices start showing abnormal
behaviour more than 36 months before any merger or
acquisition really takes place. Nevertheless, the sample is
analysed to eliminate any remaining doubts. The results
obtained using the Market Model are presented in Table 5.
It is found that the conclusions made earlier remain un-
changed. The estimated abnormal return in the month
following the suspension month is even higher compared to
thp previous cases.
Infrequent trading
When shares are traded infrequently on a stock exchange,
standard measurement of the riskiness of these shares is
subject to bias, and therefore, expected returns are not
measured accurately.4 Several methods of calculating un-
biased estimates of stock betas have been suggested in the
literature. This study employs the two widely-used methods
as proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson
(1979). Following Dimson's suggestion that with monthly
UK data one leading and several lagged market terms are
needed if risk measures are to take account of the effects of
infrequent trading, I use one lead and three lags in my
estimation of Dimson beta.
My separate estimation of systematic risk produces the
following result: while the average beta obtained from the
simple regression method is 0.58, that obtained from using
the Scholes-Williams procedure and the Dimson method is
0.56 and 0.76, respectively. Using both Scholes-Williams
beta and Dimson beta, I calculate abnormal returns once
again and present them in Table 6.
The previously obtained findings are confirmed as there is
little change in the estimated abnormal returns. Trading
suspensions on the London Stock Exchange are found to be
associated with significant positive abnormal returns. With-
in a span of four trading months, starting from two months
prior to the suspension month until one month after the
month of trading reinstatement, investors were able to earn
a total abnormal return of 22%.
VI CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the phenomenon of trading suspensions is
analysed. This regulatory measure is usually taken when the
authorities believe that a stock is being traded with inade-
quate information. My purpose is to see how effective this
measure is by investigating price behaviour of a sample of
suspended stocks. Since during the period of suspension no
trading takes place, my interest lies especially in price
behaviour surrounding this period.
Table 5. Average abnormal returns around trading suspensions: (Non-merger sample)
Month AAR t(AAR) CAAR Month AAR t(AAR)










































4The use of monthly data involves fewer problems compared to the use of daily data in which case infrequent share trading could pose a
severe problem.
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The results obtained from analysing stock returns associ-
ated with a sample of trading suspensions on the London
Stock Exchange lead to the following conclusions5. First,
suspension is preceded, on average, by an increase in share
price. This indicates the presence of anticipatory behaviour,
information leakages, or insider trading. The positive trend
in abnormal returns is independent of any particular model
used. Second, the study detects the presence of significant
positive abnormal return is the month immediately follow-
ing the month of trading reinstatement. This finding casts
doubt on the belief that trading suspension results in wide
dissemination of information among investors. It also indi-
cates that either the complete impact of new information
release takes place only gradually (a phenomenon hard to
explain in an efficient market context), or not all relevant
information is disclosed during the suspension period.
It may be useful to compare the results presented here
with those from other stock exchanges. The empirical evid-
ence is unequivocal as far as the release of new information
during the suspension period is concerned: share price
adjusts in response to the new information. The direction of
adjustment depends whether the information is favourable
or not. But the evidence remains obscure as to the share
price behaviour around the suspension period. Both efficient
as well as inefficient stock market reactions to trading
suspensions have been detected.
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